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the Austrian retail gasoline market. Results from spatial autoregres-
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Highlights:
• We empirically investigate the importance of network centrality for
pricing.
• Firms located closely to a local market center are more powerful in
the pricing game.
• Centrality is more important in larger markets (as the number of
firms increases).
2
1 Introduction and Background
The theory of social networks has provided a number of important insights for
explaining social phenomena in a wide variety of disciplines from psychology to
economics (Borgatti et al., 2009). It is a fundamental axiom in social network
research that the centrality of a node’s position within a network determines the
opportunities and constraints that it encounters and thus plays an important role
in determining a node’s power to influence other nodes and the network as a whole
(Ballester et al., 2006, 2010; Bramoullé et al., 2014; Helsley and Zenou, 2014).
This paper contributes to a growing body of research on networks in industrial
organization by investigating the importance of centrality for firms’ pricing behavior
empirically. While textbook models on spatial markets typically make strong sym-
metry assumptions, recent theoretical work in industrial organization devotes more
attention to firm heterogeneity and the implications of specific positions within a
network for firm performance. Vogel (2008), for example, studies location decisions
of firms that differ in their marginal costs. In equilibrium, more efficient firms will
be more isolated and will set higher markups (because their competitors offer relati-
vely poor substitutes). In Braid (2013) and Firgo et al. (2015) firms are located in a
network of links and nodes that can be interpreted as roads and intersections. Both
papers argue that firms characterized by a more central position in a spatial network
are more powerful in terms of having a stronger impact on their competitors’ prices
and on equilibrium prices.
In networks with spatial patterns similar to a star graph, Freeman (1979) shows
that the centrality of the central node relative to remote nodes increases monotoni-
cally with the number of nodes, which holds for a number of different concepts of
centrality. This suggests that the importance of a central supplier relative to remote
firms in a pricing game increases with the number of firms in a local market.
The following simple example illustrates the importance of centrality in firms’
price interactions and outlines our contribution to the (scarce) empirical literature.
Assume that seven firms (nodes) are located in a network of roads (edges) as in
Figure 1. Firms 1 to 4 are assigned to market A, firms 5 to 7 to market B.1 Using
standard assumptions in spatial competition models with respect to product cha-
racteristics, production costs and consumer behavior, this simple network suggests
that firms 1 and 5 will have a more ‘central’ position in their markets than all ot-
her firms. Centrality, defined as the extent to which agents are connected to other
agents, provides these two firms with a dominant role in strategic price interactions
1The definition of markets will be discussed in more detail later.
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between firms. In market A (B), firm 1 (5) competes for the same marginal consu-
mer k1,j (k5,j) with all other j firms in this market. In contrast, the ‘remote’ firms
(2, 3, and 4 as well as 6 and 7) compete for the same marginal consumer with the
‘central’ supplier only, but do not compete directly with other remote firms within
their market. In their pricing decisions, remote firms will thus consider only the
price charged by the central firm, but not the prices charged by other remote firms.
The central firm, on the other hand, takes the prices charged by all other firms
in the local market into account. Therefore, centrality endows the central supplier
with a dominant role in strategic price interactions between firms in the respective
local market: In their own pricing decisions remote firms will consider only the price
charged by the central supplier, but not other remote firms’ prices.
There is only very little empirical work on the importance of centrality in firms’
pricing decisions.2 In the remainder of the article we explore empirically whether
central suppliers indeed play a more prominent role in pricing games in the Austrian
retail gasoline market.
Figure 1: Centrality on intersecting roads
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Notes: The solid lines denote the road network, the white dots the firms, and the centers of the
local markets are labeled by X. kij indicates the location of the marginal consumer (for particular
prices and transportation costs) indifferent between purchasing at firm i or firm j, and the dashed
lines denote the local market boundaries.
2Firgo et al. (2015) assign different degrees of centrality to each supplier. The present paper is
more closely related to a star-shaped graph which implies a dichotomous distinction between one
central supplier and (all other) remote firms.
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2 Data and Identification of Market Centers
The empirical application is based on data for the geographical locations of the com-
plete population of gasoline stations in Austria collected by the company Catalist
in August 2003. Using the software ArcGIS, the geographical coordinates of each
gasoline station are located and plotted on a map. The routing tool WiGeoNetwork
by WiGeoGIS calculates distances between all gasoline stations. To account for
differences in speed limits and one-way roads, all distances are measured in driving
time. These spatial data are merged with an unbalanced panel of station-level pri-
cing data collected and provided by the Austrian Chamber of Labor nationwide on
a particular day every three months between October 1999 and March 2005 for a
total of 23 points in time. These data are supplemented by Catalist data on station
characteristics and regional data by Statistics Austria.
We follow Pinkse et al. (2002) and define markets via nearest-neighbor-relations.
Each observation is connected to its spatially nearest neighbor, and all stations are
considered to be in the same local market as long as they are connected by nearest-
neighbor-relations. Applying this market definition all 2,814 gasoline stations are
assigned to 761 non-overlapping local markets.3
The market center is defined as the unique point which minimizes the sum of
distances to all gasoline stations in the local market (i.e. the 1-median location; see
Hakimi, 1964). Potential market centers are restricted to points located on the road
network. In Figure 1, CA and CB represent the market centers for markets A and
B. The central supplier (firm 1 in market A and firm 5 in market B) is the station
located most closely to the market center, while all other stations are denoted as
remote suppliers. Using actual data for the Austrian retail gasoline market, Figure
2 illustrates four different local markets, their road networks, gasoline stations and
market centers.
Observations are included in the empirical analysis only if prices are observed
for all stations in the respective local market in a particular time period, which
reduces the size of the initial sample to 501 stations in 171 local markets. We
further exclude observations in 79 markets where a unique central position cannot
3In Figure 1, for example, this approach defines two separate markets, comprising firms 1 to 4
and firms 5 to 7, respectively. The fact that this implies no interaction between local markets
is a reasonable assumption in our application. In our sample, the average driving time to the
closest station outside the respective local market is 4.3 minutes longer than the shortest (and 1.7
minutes longer than the average) distance to rivaling firms within the local market. This suggests
that local markets (as defined by nearest-neighbor-relations) are only loosely related to other local
markets.
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Figure 2: Empirical examples of local markets and their centers

 
Notes: Each map represents a local market. Gasoline stations are marked by gray
dots, the market centers by stars and the central stations by plus signs. Major (minor)
roads are depicted by triple (single) lines.
be identified.4 Eventually, the empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel
of 343 stations in 92 different markets comprising three to six competitors (2,920
observations in total). Summary statistics are provided in Table 1:5 PRICE denotes
nominal retail prices of diesel6 measured in Euro-cents per liter, CENTRAL is a
dummy variable indicating whether a particular station is the central supplier, and
DIST TO CENTER measures the driving time (in minutes) from the gasoline station
to the local market center.
4In ‘linear city’ (Hotelling, 1929) markets with an even number of firms, a unique (1-median)
central location does not exist.
5The definition of all other variables and summary statistics related to them are reported in
Appendix A (available online).
6Unlike in North America, diesel-engined vehicles are most popular in Austria, accounting for more
than 50% of registered passenger vehicles in 2005 (Statistics Austria, 2006).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean (S.D.) Min. Max. # of Obs.
PRICE 75.600 (6.423) 61.900 92.000 2,920
CENTRAL 0.268 (0.443) 0 1 2,920
DIST TO CENTER 2.468 (3.660) 0 23.640 2,920
3 Model Specification and Results
The following econometric model has frequently been estimated to account for spa-
tial interactions in pricing between neighboring firms (Pennerstorfer, 2009).
p = ρWp+Xβ + , (1)
with p as the vector of prices. W is a spatial weights matrix of dimension N × N
(N is the total number of observations) and summarizes the dependence structure
between gasoline station i at time t and station j at time u. The typical element
wit,ju = 1 if stations i and j are in the same local market, i 6= j and t = u, and
zero else. X includes station- and location-specific characteristics, time period fixed
effects as well as dummy variables for each local market, with β as the respective
vector of parameters to be estimated and  as the error term. Parameter ρ measures
the pricing interaction between neighboring gasoline stations.
This model, however, does not allow measuring differences in the importance
of central and remote suppliers in pricing interactions. To explore such differences
explicitly, we extend this model in various ways. First, we explore whether the
intensity of price interaction between pairs of stations changes with market size:
p =
6∑
s=3
M s (ρsWp) +Xβ + . (2)
The size of the market (i.e. the number of stations within a market) is denoted by s
(s = 3, ..., 6). M s is a diagonal matrix of dimension N×N withms,it,it = 1 if station
i is located in a market of size s, and 0 else. As the effect of one station’s decision
on other stations’ decisions is expected to diminish as the number of stations in a
local market increases (Barron et al., 2008), separate parameters (ρs) are estimated
for markets with different numbers of stations.
Second, to explore whether interaction in pricing between stations depends on
the stations’ positions within the network (centrality), we estimate the following
model:
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p =
6∑
s=3
M s
(
ρC→Rs WCp+ ρ
R→C
s CWp+ ρ
R→R
s RWRp
)
+Xβ + . (3)
C (R) is a diagonal matrix with element cit,it = 1 (rit,it = 1) if station i is a central
(remote) supplier, and 0 else. Parameter ρC→R can be interpreted as the effect of
the price of a central supplier on a remote competitor within the same local market
(i.e. ρC→R = ∂pit
∂pjt
for station i as a remote and station j as the central supplier),
ρR→C as the effect of a remote supplier’s price on the central supplier’s price (i.e.
ρR→C = ∂pit
∂pjt
for station i as the central supplier and station j as a remote supplier),
and ρR→R as pricing interaction between two remote suppliers (i.e. ρR→R = ∂pit
∂pjt
for
both station i 6= j as remote suppliers). If gasoline stations located most closely
to a market center actually exert the strongest effect on pricing decisions of other
stations, we would expect to find ρC→Rs > ρR→Cs and ρC→Rs > ρR→Rs .
Clearly, competitor prices on the right hand side of equations (2) and (3) are
endogenous and OLS will produce biased results. As a common solution in applied
spatial econometrics the reduced form of the regression equation is estimated via
maximum likelihood (see Anselin, 2001 for an overview). Cost shocks over time,
which are common to all stations (such as fluctuations of crude oil prices), are
captured by fixed time effects. Spatial autocorrelation due to differences in local
demand or costs across markets are controlled for by local market-level fixed effects.
Results from the benchmark specification (equation (2)) are reported in column
[1] of Table 2. This model does not allow for asymmetries and restricts the para-
meters such that ρC→Rs = ρR→Cs = ρR→Rs = ρs. All parameter estimates for ρs are
significantly positive; a higher price charged by one station is associated with higher
prices of rival stations within the same local market. In addition, column [1] clearly
suggests that the interaction in pricing between neighboring stations (ρs) becomes
smaller as the number of stations (s) increases.
Column [2] in Table 2 reports parameter estimates of the model in which the
pricing interaction parameters ρs are allowed to differ between central and remote
suppliers (equation (3)). In small markets (with three stations only; s = 3) our
results suggest that there is hardly any difference in the parameters ρs between
central and remote stations. The two-sample t-tests reported in Table 3 indicate
that none of the null hypotheses ρC→R3 = ρR→C3 , ρC→R3 = ρR→R3 and ρR→C3 = ρR→R3
can be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. Thus, centrality does not
seem to matter in small markets.
6
Table 2: Results of the maximum likelihood estimations
Specification [1] [2]
Coef. (S.D.) Sign. Coef. (S.D.) Sign.
ρ3 0.317 (0.005) ***
ρ4 0.212 (0.004) ***
ρ5 0.166 (0.003) ***
ρ6 0.131 (0.004) ***
ρC→R3 0.306 (0.033) ***
ρR→C3 0.311 (0.006) ***
ρR→R3 0.335 (0.032) ***
ρC→R4 0.288 (0.029) ***
ρR→C4 0.207 (0.004) ***
ρR→R4 0.177 (0.015) ***
ρC→R5 0.438 (0.002) ***
ρR→C5 0.163 (0.004) ***
ρR→R5 0.079 (0.001) ***
ρC→R6 0.403 (0.103) ***
ρR→C6 0.127 (0.004) ***
ρR→R6 0.061 (0.027) **
CONSTANT 29.682 (1.269) *** 29.017 (1.303) ***
CENTRAL 0.238 (0.162) 1.674 (0.822) **
DIST TO CENTER 0.039 (0.018) ** 0.033 (0.018) *
CENTRAL × DIST TO CENTER 0.077 (0.365) 0.178 (0.361)
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Station-Specific Characteristics Yes Yes
Location-Specific Characteristics Yes Yes
` -4,688.585 -4,669.098
σ2µ 0.315 0.302
σ2ν 1.965 1.943
Notes: # of obs.: 2,920; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
level. Inference is based on a variance-covariance matrix of  that is clustered at the
station level (with it = µi + νit, µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ) and νit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν)). Parameter
estimates on station- and regional-specific control variables are reported in Table 5 in
Appendix B (available online).
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However, we find that centrality matters in larger markets. Figure 3 illustrates
the parameter estimates for ρs, ρC→Rs , ρR→Cs , and ρR→Rs for markets of different size
s obtained from column [2] of Table 2. The parameter estimates for ρs, ρR→Cs , and
ρR→Rs decline with the size of the market, which corresponds to the results obtained
in column [1]. Interaction in pricing between two neighboring stations becomes
less intense as the number of stations (s) increases. In contrast, the parameter
estimates for ρC→Rs , i.e. the impact of the central supplier on price-setting of remote
firms, remains stable (or even increases slightly) as market size increases. The
difference between parameter estimates for ρC→Rs and all other ρs parameters is
significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level for all markets with
s ≥ 4 stations. Including state-fixed effects and/or regional characteristics instead
of local market-fixed effects hardly affects the parameter estimates (the results are
shown in Appendix C, available online).
Our results thus add empirical evidence to the literature on (social) networks
investigating the linkage between centrality and performance. We conclude that (a)
centrality matters for firms’ pricing behavior and (b) this effect of centrality becomes
more important as the size of the market (i.e. the number of firms in this market)
increases. Future research should provide additional empirical evidence using alter-
native concepts for delimiting markets by applying new methods for identifying ’the
key player’ (Ballester et al., 2006) and by investigating the importance of centrality
in different market environments.
Table 3: t-test statistics for asymmetry in the spatially autoregressive parameters
Market Size Number of ρC→Rs = ρR→Cs ρC→Rs = ρR→Rs ρR→Cs = ρR→Rs
Observations
s = 3 1,176 0.215 0.887 1.034
(0.830) (0.375) (0.301)
s = 4 1,016 3.891 4.768 2.652
(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.008)a
s = 5 470 89.449 317.510 28.957
(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
s = 6 258 3.792 4.557 3.476
(0.000)a (0.000)a (0.001)a
Notes: a significant at the 1% level; p-values in parentheses. Test statistics are based
on two sample t-tests with unequal variances for the respective parameter estimates.
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Figure 3: Asymmetry in the spatially autoregressive parameters
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Notes: The solid line denotes the slope parameter ρs (on the vertical axis) depending on the
number of stations in a local market (horizontal axis) in the symmetric case (specification
[1]). The dashed (dotted) [chain dotted] line denotes the parameter ρC→Rs (ρR→Cs ) [ρR→Rs ]
of specification [2] in Table 2.
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Appendices: For Online Publication Only
A Additional Explanatory Variables
The data on prices are supplemented by station- and location-specific characteristics
to account for product, demand and cost heterogeneity. Summary statistics of these
variables are provided in Table 4. Station characteristics include the information on
whether a gasoline station is independent or BRANDED, owned by a company or by
the DEALER, offers full attendance SERVICE and has a surface of more than 2,000
square meters (SIZE >2,000m2). Location-specific attributes include information
on whether the station is located along a HIGHWAY and whether it is located at a
road with heavy TRAFFIC.7 These data are also provided by Catalist.
Table 4: Summary statistics of additional variables
Variable Mean (S.D.) Min. Max. # of Obs.
Station-Specific Characteristics:
BRANDED 0.852 (0.355) 0 1 2,920
DEALER 0.275 (0.447) 0 1 2,829
SERVICE 0.257 (0.437) 0 1 2,692
SIZE >2,000m2 0.344 (0.475) 0 1 2,849
Location-Specific Characteristics:
HIGHWAY 0.012 (0.109) 0 1 2,746
TRAFFIC 0.732 (0.443) 0 1 2,746
(1− CENTRAL) ×
DIST CENTRALa 0.265 (0.365) 0 2.720 2,137
CENTRAL ×
AV DIST REMOTEb 3.205 (2.656) 0.130 16.250 783
(1− CENTRAL) ×
AV DIST REMOTEa 3.275 (3.251) 0.040 18.510 2,137
Notes: a (b) Summary statistics of this variable are calculated for re-
mote (central) stations only.
The other location-specific characteristics reported in Table 4 are based on the
exact location of the stations and the market center in each local market and sum-
marize information on the locations of the other stations in the market with respect
to the market center. (1 − CENTRAL) × DIST CENTRAL is only different from
zero if an observation regards a remote station and the value reflects the distance
between the central station of the market and the center. CENTRAL × AV DIST
REMOTE is the average distance of all remote stations to the market center for
7For each gasoline station the data contain four categories of traffic levels (very heavy, heavy,
medium, low) that the station is assigned to by the surveyors of the company Catalist. The
variable TRAFFIC is equal to one if traffic is considered to be (very) heavy and is zero otherwise.
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the central observation. If an observation regards a remote station, this variable is
equal to zero. On the other hand, (1− CENTRAL) × AV DIST REMOTE is only
different from zero if a station is considered to be remote. It describes the average
distance of all other remote stations (excluding the observation itself) to the market
center. These variables are included to capture the spatial heterogeneity within a
local market and are again measured in driving time (in minutes).
As revealed by the number of observations in Table 4, information is missing on
some variables for a very small fraction of observations. As the data are missing
(completely) at random and the share of missing data is very small, missing infor-
mation is replaced by zeros in the estimations and dummy variables equal to one
are included if the information is missing for an observation, and zero otherwise.
B Parameter Estimates of Other Explanatory Va-
riables
Table 5 reports results obtained from estimating equations (2) and (3), and summa-
rizes parameter estimates of station- and location-specific characteristics of model
specifications [1] and [2] which are not explicitly shown in Table 2.
C Sensitivity Analysis
In the model specifications reported in the main part of this article we include
dummy variables for each local market to account for unobserved heterogeneity. As
a robustness test we include regional characteristics instead of market-level fixed
effects. The respective regional characteristics include the ratio of in- and out-
commuters (COMMUTERS) to the population of the municipality hosting a gaso-
line station. The variable TOURISM is the number of touristic overnight stays in
the municipality in the month observed (measured in 1,000). The degree of urba-
nization is measured by the population density (POP DENSITY). To account for
regional cost differences we include the prices for factory PREMISES (in Euros per
square meter) and the share of alpine surface and woods (ALPS+WOODS) in the
municipality (in percent). The latter controls for remoteness associated with hig-
her transportation costs on the supply side. These data are provided by Statistics
Austria. Summary statistics on these variables are reported below in Table 6.
The results of the regression analysis are reported below in Table 7. Data on
tourism and population density are included in logarithmic terms, and specification
2
Table 5: Results of the maximum likelihood estimations (continued)
Specification [1] [2]
Coef. (S.D.) Sign. Coef. (S.D.) Sign.
Station-Specific Characteristics:
BRANDED 0.946 (0.193) *** 0.993 (0.191) ***
DEALER OWNED -0.190 (0.143) -0.189 (0.141)
SERVICE -0.271 (0.150) * -0.240 (0.150)
SIZE > 2, 000 0.360 (0.123) *** 0.348 (0.122) ***
Location-Specific Characteristics:
HIGHWAY 6.293 (0.404) *** 6.110 (0.401) ***
TRAFFIC GOOD 0.196 (0.146) 0.167 (0.144)
(1− CENTRAL) ×
DIST CENTRAL 0.240 (0.319) 0.296 (0.317)
CENTRAL ×
AV DIST REMOTE 0.029 (0.040) 0.040 (0.040)
(1− CENTRAL) ×
AV DIST REMOTE 0.020 (0.084) 0.040 (0.084)
` -4,688.585 -4,669.098
σ2µ 0.315 0.302
σ2ν 1.965 1.943
Notes: # of obs.: 2,920; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant
at 10% level. Inference is based on a variance-covariance matrix of  that
is clustered at the station level (with it = µi + νit, µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ) and
νit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν)).
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis: Summary statistics of additional variables
Variable Mean (S.D.) Min. Max. # of Obs.
Regional Characteristics:
COMMUTERS 35.037 (13.836) 11.482 110.760 2,920
TOURISM 124.689 (238.389) 0.009 836.691 2,467
POP DENSITY 1,262.806 (2,534.873) 4.166 18,153.518 2,920
PREMISES 119.909 (67.629) 15.800 280.800 2,836
ALPS+WOODS 38.346 (26.359) 0 87.236 2,920
3
[4] includes state fixed effects, depending on the federal state where the station is
located.8 The parameter estimates on ρC→Rs , ρR→Cs and ρR→Rs are hardly affected
by this alteration. As in the main specification [2] reported in Table 2, the null
hypotheses ρC→R3 = ρR→C3 , ρC→R3 = ρR→R3 and ρR→C3 = ρR→R3 cannot be rejected at
any reasonable level of significance, whereas the parameter estimates for ρC→Rs are
significantly larger compared to all other ρs parameters for all markets with s ≥ 4
stations.
These results also suggest that centrality does not matter in very small markets,
but becomes more important as the size of the market increases, and therefore
confirms the finding of the main part of this article.
8Austria is divided into 9 federal states.
4
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis: Results of the maximum likelihood estimations
Specification [3] [4]
Coef. (S.D.) Sign. Coef. (S.D.) Sign.
ρC→R3 0.324 (0.032) *** 0.347 (0.032) ***
ρR→C3 0.324 (0.006) *** 0.335 (0.005) ***
ρR→R3 0.344 (0.031) *** 0.344 (0.032) ***
ρC→R4 0.260 (0.027) *** 0.246 (0.027) ***
ρR→C4 0.214 (0.004) *** 0.222 (0.004) ***
ρR→R4 0.203 (0.014) *** 0.221 (0.014) ***
ρC→R5 0.482 (0.002) *** 0.549 (0.002) ***
ρR→C5 0.161 (0.003) *** 0.167 (0.003) ***
ρR→R5 0.063 (0.001) *** 0.048 (0.001) ***
ρC→R6 0.331 (0.082) *** 0.322 (0.083) ***
ρR→C6 0.129 (0.003) *** 0.133 (0.003) ***
ρR→R6 0.082 (0.021) *** 0.090 (0.021) ***
CONSTANT 26.788 (1.116) *** 25.107 (0.932) ***
CENTRAL 1.808 (0.826) ** 1.801 (0.824) **
DIST TO CENTER 0.029 (0.020) 0.030 (0.021)
CENTRAL × DIST TO CENTER -0.092 (0.234) -0.090 (0.242)
Station-Specific Characteristics:
BRANDED 0.886 (0.181) *** 0.874 (0.183) ***
DEALER OWNED -0.172 (0.139) -0.242 (0.141) *
SERVICE -0.017 (0.143) -0.120 (0.148)
SIZE > 2, 000 0.299 (0.114) *** 0.218 (0.113) *
Location-Specific Characteristics:
HIGHWAY 5.498 (0.388) *** 5.289 (0.404) ***
TRAFFIC GOOD 0.099 (0.131) 0.296 (0.131) **
(1− CENTRAL) ×
DIST CENTRAL 0.132 (0.155) 0.148 (0.156)
CENTRAL ×
AV DIST REMOTE 0.043 (0.044) 0.040 (0.046)
(1− CENTRAL) ×
AV DIST REMOTE 0.008 (0.034) -0.011 (0.032)
Regional Characteristics:
COMMUTERS 0.005 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004)
ln TOURISM 0.026 (0.035) -0.005 (0.029)
ln POP DENSITY -0.052 (0.062) -0.130 (0.059) **
ln PREMISES 0.099 (0.117) 0.309 (0.100) ***
ALPS+WOOD 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Market Fixed Effects No No
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes No
` -4,773.373 -4,832.620
σ2µ 0.407 0.500
σ2ν 1.949 1.885
Notes: # of obs.: 2,920; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
level. Inference is based on a variance-covariance matrix of  that is clustered at the
station level (with it = µi + νit, µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ) and νit ∼ IID(0, σ2ν)).
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